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Abstract: Those who seek settled property rights in Equity will find little comfort in this paper. With legal realism in 
mind the author asks what are the courts of Equity doing to property when recognising an institutional constructive 
trust? The author concludes that there is little distinction between a remedial and an institutional constructive trust; 
they are the same remedial equitable mechanisms for transferring property from A to B in equity. That is, an ICT, 
like the RCT is are awarded/imposed/recognised by the courts based on the underlying concepts of fairness and 
justice (or the equitable term of art; 'unconscionability'). The ICT is seen as legitimate because it hides behind the 
mask of language of 'institution'. Finally if jurisdictions continue to recognise and impose the ICT, then there is no 
logic in rejecting the RCT as an any less legitimate tool in the Equities armory.  
                                                
* Submitted in 2014 by Mr Jacob Joseph Meagher in part fulfillment of the research requirements of the 
Bachelor of Laws (Hons) at Victoria University of Wellington.  
1 William Swadling "The Fiction of the Constructive Trust" (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 399 at 432. 
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Introduction 
[1] The Remedial Constructive Trusts' (RCT) battle for recognition is a never ending war in 
Chancery between those who advocate for rules which are clear, principled and 
predictable "and those who support the view that equity is concerned to be flexible and 
fair, so that outcomes in individual cases can be seen to be just."2 The RCT's raison 
d'etre is juridical discretion principled on unconscionability, fairness and justice 
allowing expropriation of rights in rem from A to B. Such a trust of discretion might not 
be institutionalised. Lord Neuberger, writing extra-judicially, has placed the onus on 
those who speak favorably of the RCT to prove its legitimacy.3 I admit the deficiency in 
my paper in that I do not identify a single unifying principle justifying the intervention 
of equity.4 Yet an attempt to identify a general form would be unwise; for that would 
advocate equity to be as rigid as the Common Law, and then what would be the point?5  
 
[2] To advance the debate on the RCT and the fiction distinguishing the remedial (RCT) 
and institutional (ICT) constructive trusts, I argue that both trusts are discretionary 
proprietary remedies. Clear points of law do not need to be steeped in complex 
language by the courts and academics to give them legitimacy or mask the juridical 
reality, the oft cited nomenclature of the "institution" or "arising by operation of law" 
statements.6 Both ICT and RCT, when recognised-awarded-imposed, (in this instance 
these have the same meaning) are made on the basis of "fairness and justice" or using  
in vogue phrase: "the equitable term of art of unconscionability."7 There is nothing 
unprincipled about such an exercise. 
  
                                                
2 David Neuberger "The Remedial Constructive Trust - Fact or Fiction" (paper presented to the Banking 
Services and Finance Law Association Conference, Queenstown, 10 August 2014) at [39]. 
3 At [42]. 
4 Stephen Trew "Remedial Constructive Trusts; revisits and redefines equitable remedies" [1999] NZLJ 
175 at 177. 
5 See Craig Rotherham "Property and Justice" <www.academia.edu> at 1. The author cites LA Selby-
Bigge and PH Nidditch (eds) David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature (2nd ed, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1978) at 491: "The origin of justice explains that of property." I quote this as a retort to the oft cited 
saying "but equity is part of the law of property" to which one who follows the British philosopher Hume 
could reply "But does the origin of justice not explain that of property" and at 491: "Tis very preposterous, 
therefore, to imagine, that we can have any idea of property, without fully comprehending the nature of 
justice." 
6 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC [1996] UKHL 12, [1996] 2 AC 669 at 714–715. 
7 This is a phrase I take responsibility for coining, and I hope it betrays my suspicion for the legal realism 
underlying the word "unconscionability". For when Judges in Chancery discover "unconscionability" I 
suggest this is subjective immorality, the opposite of fairness and justice, based on normative personal 
views informed from years at the bar and bench. 
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I The Remedial Beast Exists  
 
[3] In the 2009 House of Lords decision in Thorner v Major (a unanimous judgment), Lord 
Scott of Foscote would have imposed a RCT and held that in that instance he would 
exercise his inherent discretionary powers and impose the trust as a remedial 
proprietary remedy.8 Lord Scott's judgment has been questioned by Lord Neuberger, 
who sat on the appeal, where he asserted, extra-judicially, that Lord Scott 
misunderstood the meaning of the RCT.9 It is unlikely that Lord Scott confused the ICT 
and  RCT.. In the NZ Supreme Court case of Regal Castings Ltd v Lightbody10 Tipping 
J took the fortuitous opportunity11 to uphold his dicta in Fortex where he held that the 
RCT was recognised "cautiously and provisionally".12 In Regal Castings he disagreed 
with the ICT rout adopted by his colleagues,13 Tipping J found the ICT rout "artificial" 
and gave the Official Assignee a "straightforward course of directly imposing a 
remedial constructive trust on the trustees of the family trust".14 Now, post 2008, the 
RCT has been imposed in NZ and can be pleaded,15 as it can in Australia, although on 
different grounds.16 Still, in the UK and NZ the RCT is not liked by scholars.17 
 
The Primary arguments against the RCT 
[4] There are three primary arguments against the RCT. All stem from its central feature 
that it is both a proprietary and discretionary remedy. This leads juridical 
conservatives 18  to the primary argument against the trust; that the RCT and its 
imposition is uncertain,19 and in a legal system such as ours "[r]eliability and certainty 
are primary considerations of any system of property rights, and the unprovoked 
alteration of those rights is to be avoided where possible."20 
 
[5] The secondary argument on "discretionary nature" rests primarily on the negative 
affects on third parties – usually creditors in insolvency situations – due to the 
unpredictability of its imposition. This is a vast overstatement of the prejudicial effect 
                                                
8 Thorner v Major & Ors [2009] UKHL 18 at [14]. 
9 Neuberger, above n 2, at [20]. 
10 Regal Castings Limited v Lightbody [2008] NZSC 87. 
11 Perhaps his last opportunity to discuss Fortex due to his impending retirement in 2012.  
12 Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and Liquidation) v MacIntosh [1998] 3 NZLR 171 (CA) at 172–173. 
13 Blanchard and Wilson JJ at [78] expressed no disagreement with Tipping J's imposition of a RCT. 
14 Regal Castings Limited v Lightbody, above n 10, at [162]. 
15 Commonwealth Reserves I v Chodar [2001] 2 NZLR 374 (HC); Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and 
Liquidation) v MacIntosh, above n 12; Juliet Chevalier-Watts and Sue Tappenden Equity, Trusts and 
Succession (Thompson Reuters, Wellington, 2013); and Andrew S Butler and Tim Clarke (eds) Equity 
and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington 2009) at 351. 
16 Muschinski v Dodds [1985] 62 ALR 429 (HCA), among many other cases. The RCT is now the most 
common CT in Australia. 
17 Butler and Clarke, above n 17, at 350. 
18 I use the term "conservative" not to criticise, but to identify those in the legal profession/judiciary who 
value certainty of property rights above all other rights. A contrast can be drawn between the Equity bar 
in Canada/Australia and the UK, the latter being far more conservative and the former arguably more 
liberal.  
19 Neuberger, above n 2, at [6]. 
20 Commonwealth Reserves I v Chodar, above n 15, at [47]. 
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of the imposition of a RCT21 and, in my view, illogical. I will later discuss that the 
advantage of the RCT, inherent in its discretionary design, is the protection of third 
parties; Grantham and Rickett identify this as their third criterion of the RCT22 and 
indeed Tipping J identified in Fortex that a RCT would not be imposed if the equities 
militated against innocent third parties.23 Yet the argument against RCTs is that they 
arise at the time of the court order, or are entirely at the discretion of the court whether 
or not to order their creation, as they are a remedy. Therefore the plaintiff will 
automatically gain priority over the rights of third party creditors thus upsetting pari 
passu.24 This is a misunderstanding of the reality of a RCT as a creation of the court. 
The trust, evidenced by a court order, results in the plaintiff not automatically gaining 
priority over the rights of third parties; this is for the judge to decide by balancing the 
equities.25 This contrasts with the ICT which generally upsets pari passu by affecting 
third parties.26  
 
[6] The third argument against the RCT, which I term "the inherent concern of the 
judiciary" and the judicial concern, of unveiling their discretionary equitable powers 
with regards to property rights, is a common thread through this paper. This concern is 
overcome by recognising that both the ICT and RCT are both inherently remedial and 
indeed are of the same ilk. This is key to the argument, that if the judiciary evidences 
little concern when recognising the ICT then it should logically have no concern for 
imposing RCTs, as both are essentially the same mechanisms. Nevertheless the 
judiciary is wary of altering settled property rights by way of a trust for any reason 
other then on settled institutional principles. The judiciary tend to regularly use a trust 
as a remedy but craft their actions in the word "institution" or describe the RCT in 
unflattering language.27  
 
[7] Other jurisdictions, namely Canada,28 Singapore29 and Australia30 are more than happy 
to alter property rights,31 and in contrast to the UK,32 recognise that they have been 
                                                
21 Paul D Friedman and Catherine Newman "Remedial Constructive Trusts Where to Next? Part II" 
(2000) 6(8) Trusts & Trustees 6 at 7. 
22 Ross B Grantham and Charles EF Rickett Enrichment and Restitution in New Zealand (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2000) at 416. 
23 Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and Liquidation) v MacIntosh, above n 12, at 176. 
24 Roy Goode Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law (4th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2011) at 246; 
see "Impact of the Pari Passu Principle" and "The Proof, Valuation and Ranking of Claims in Winding 
Up". 
25 Friedman and Newman, above n 21, at 7. 
26  Alastair Hudson Equity and Trusts (7th ed, Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon (UK), 2013) at ch 12.1; 
recognising that the property, always in equity, belong to the beneficiaries. This does not make the 
situation any more palatable for the creditor who relies on the legal "paper" title. 
27 Neuberger, above n 2, at [6]. Lord Neuberger describes the RCT as displaying "equity at its flexible 
flabby worst". 
28 Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 SCR 217. 
29 Wee Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801 (Court of Appeal); The Singapore 
Court of Appeal recognised that it could have imposed a RCT, and that the ICT, at least in Singapore was 
inherently remedial. 
30 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16. 
31 Donovan Waters "The constructive trust: two theses – England and Wales, and Canada" (September 
2010) STEP Journal <www.step.org>. 
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doing so by means of the ICT all along and take no issue with this fact: the trust for 
them is a remedy. Australia has reached this point by accepting that there is little 
distinction between an RCT and an ICT – both are underlyingly remedial.33 Canada has 
reached the point by another road, the legal realism of Lord Denning in Hussey v 
Palmer34 where he stated that equity is an exposition of fairness and justice and he 
imposed a trust over property based on that discretionary criterion.35  
 
[8] The broader underlying concern is that of altering the social contract by affecting 
change to settled property rights based on judicial discretion of "fairness and justice".36 
Only principles of law, or statute, according to English law, can change settled property 
rights.37 The ICT is considered to arise by "operation of law"38 and thus is acceptable. 
This argument is based on a wholly false premise, that the ICT is not in fact remedial, 
which I turn to next. Nourse  LJ outlines the conservative English view:39  
 
… we must recognise that the [RCT] gives the court a discretion to vary proprietary 
rights. You cannot grant a proprietary right to A, who has not had one beforehand, 
without taking some proprietary right away form B. No English court has ever had the 
power to do that … . 
 
[9] In terms of policy there exist two schools of thought with regards to the RCT, and both 
have merits. The first theory is that judicial discretion controls the existence of the RCT. 
The second theory holds that the trust's existence is automatic on equitable principles, 
"unconscioinabilty", yet its vindication in a proprietary right (usually against third 
parties) is discretionary.40 The latter view is supported by Grantham and Rickett.41   
 
[10] Jessica Palmer suggests that the operation of the RCT is unclear, criticising its apparent 
reliance on vague abstractions.42 Yet even with such a conservative viewpoint Palmer 
recognises the inherent remedial link between the ICT and the RCT hypothesising that a 
reason for the "irrational" existence of the RCT could be that at one time "institutional" 
trusts may have been considered "remedial" before becoming hardened and 
                                                                                                                                          
32 The UK has, in the past, rejected attempts from Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal to give the 
judiciary more freedom to alter property rights in equity per Lloyds Bank v Rosset [1990] UKHL 14, 
[1991] 1 AC 107. 
33 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16, at 451 per Deane J. See also Waters, above n 31.  
34 Hussey v Palmer [1972] 3 All ER 744 (CA). The jurisprudence of Lord Denning will be discussed in 
later paragraphs. 
35 Donovan Waters in Stephen Goldstein (ed) Equity and Contemporary Legal Developments (1992) 457 
at 463 as cited in AJ Oakley "Restitution and Constructive Trusts" in WR Cornish, Richard Nolan, J 
O'Sullivan and G Virgo (eds) Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000) 212, at 220 
36 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16, at [9] per Deane J where he identified that while "the constructive 
trust remains predominantly remedial … [it] does not, however, mean that it represents a medium for the 
indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice". 
37 In re Polly Peck International plc (No 2) [1998] 3 All ER 812 (CA) at 829–30 per Mummery LJ. 
38 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, above n 6, at 714–715. 
39 In re Polly Peck International plc (No 2), above n 37, at 829–30. 
40 S Gardner "The Element of Discretion" in PBH Birks (ed) Frontiers of Liability (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1994) vol 2 186 at 191  
41 See part II of this paper. 
42 Jessica Palmer "Constructive Trusts" in Andrew S Butler and Tim Clarke (eds) Equity and Trusts in 
New Zealand (2nd ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington 2009) 335, at 350. 
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"institutional".43 However, Palmer considers that the basis of those 'pre-hardened' trusts 
was not, contra the current RCT, "unfettered discretion."44 With respect, the basis of the 
current RCT is not "unfettered discretion" and this does not resolve the RCT  debate.  
 
Institutional as a contra-distinction to Remedial?  
[11] Over time equity has varied and awarded property rights, I suggest "proprietary 
remedies",45 from A to B in factual situations. These are known as the institutional 
constructive trusts, where  UK and NZ law recognises four situations which have 
hardened resulting in a quasi-automatic response  from the courts.46 This does not mean 
that there is no recognition of underlying unconscionability in the institution, just that it 
is clearly apparent, or that the operation of the "institution" is not remedial. It does not 
follow that merely because four types of trusts are institutions and therefore "arise" that 
there cannot be instances of other trusts which are remedial and do not arise 
institutionally but with judicial discretion. In contrast, that a RCT is firstly discretionary 
does not mean that in time there will not be a string of "institutional" (in the hardened 
automatic sense) RCT cases. That does not belie the fact that those cases are still 
remedial or discretionary, such is our system of precedent. 
 
[12] I do not suggest that we dispose of the distinction between the ICT and the RCT, as 
there are categories of constructive trusts which have now become "institutional" in the 
above sense. This would ignore the benefits of precedent.  I argue that doctrinally the 
ICT does not oppose the RCT. Both are remedial, and both act as remedial mechanisms. 
 
[13] The commentary highlights that in the courts and academia conservative attitudes’ are 
changing, recognising that judges can change settled property rights and the social 
contract has not been torn asunder. The main contention is that the RCT expressly states 
that property rights are being altered on the basis of "fairness and justice" or 
unconscionability which been harder to accept. Unconscionability is the trusts' 
underlying principle,47 and in equity we are not so timorous to deny this as part of a 
legitimate proprietary response.48 
 
  
                                                
43 At 351. 
44 At 351. 
45 The distinction being that a "right" implies that the property in question belonged to the person in 
equity beforehand, and a "remedy" implies some form of equitable compensation. 
46 I outline the four ICT situations in the next section. 
47 Commonwealth Reserves I v Chodar, above n 15, at [42]. 
48 Craig Rotherham Proprietary Remedies in Context (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2002) at 49. Rotherham 
advances a "normative approach to legal justification, to transcend unquestioned assumptions inherited 
from another age, and to accept responsibility for defining the meaning of property." That is to say that 
there has been a tendency to justify proprietary responses after the event meaning doctrine is not logically 
sound between different cases. 
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II Timorous souls v bold spirits  
 
"On the one side there were the timorous souls who were fearful of allowing a new cause of action. On 
the other side there were the bold spirits who were ready to allow it if justice so required. It was fortunate 
for the common law that the progressive view prevailed."49  
 
The rational behind the distinction and the principle objections  
[14] In the UK (and NZ) the courts recognise four types of constructive trusts, known 
commonly as ICTs.50The court recognises a trust as pre-existing where: advantages 
have been obtained by fiduciaries in breach of their duty of loyalty;51 strangers have 
intermeddled with trust property;52 advantages have been obtained by fraudulent or 
unconscionable conduct;53 and, common intention constructive trusts / trusts based on 
contributions to property (commonly in relation to homes). 54  These "categories" 
fluctuate to the extent that some trusts are usually left at the fringes: four is not an 
immutable number.55   
 
[15] These groupings should not be viewed as definitional, the murkiness in the doctrine 
could be understood by the lack of comprehensive/unifying definition 56  of the 
"constructive trust", or more likely an attempt to create a comprehensive definition of 
an area of trusts law where no discrete taxonomy exists. Justifications have been given, 
as in Carl Zeiss v Herbert Smith but they are timorous and defy logic:57 
 
Its boundaries have been left perhaps deliberately vague, so as not to restrict the court 
by technicalities in deciding what the justice of a particular case may demand. 
 
[16] If the above is a valid rational for the varied definition of the ICT, how can such a trust, 
with its (so called) settled categories,  be termed "institutional"? Edmond Davies LJ 
understood the form of trust to be  of the court's own making or imposition, yet justified 
by referring to "justice" and  various "demands". Is this definition more likely to be 
given now to a RCT, not an ICT? Some ten years later in what is now the perennial 
statement from the House of Lords, an ICT arises by "operation of law"58 and, its 
categories have hardened into easily identifiable institutions. This is a legal fiction of 
the first order. I note that Carl Zeiss occurred pre Hussey v Palmer, so it would be 
incorrect to suggest that the idea of remedialism in the UK constructive trust doctrine 
                                                
49 Candler v Crane, Christmas and Co [1951] 2 KB 164 at 178 per Denning LJ dissenting. 
50 Paul D Friedman and Catherine Newman "Remedial Constructive Trusts Where to Next? Part I" (2000) 
6(7) Trusts & Trustees 20 at 20–21. 
51 Boardman v Phipps [1966] UKHL 2, [1967] 2 AC 46. See also Keech v Sandford [1726] 25 ER 223 
(Ch). 
52 Hudson, above n 26, at 575 sometimes known as a "trustee de son tort". See also Mara v Browne 
[1896] 1 Ch 199. 
53 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid [1993] UKPC 36. 
54 Lloyds Bank Plc v Rosset, above n 32. See also Lankow v Rose [1995] 1 NZLR 277 (CA). 
55 For example constructive trusts in relation to specifically enforceable contracts, or Re Rose type CT's, 
or CTs known by case names such as Walsh v Lonsdale, Rochefoucault v Boustead. 
56 Chevalier-Watts and Tappenden, above n 15, at 91. 
57 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co (No 2) [1969] 2 Ch 271. 
58 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, above n 6, at 714–715. 
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started with Lord Denning's new model,59 indeed the seed was recognised much earlier. 
Hudson, in a leading UK text Equity and Trusts,60 uses Edmond Davies LJ's statement 
in support of the "essential truth that the constructive trust is not a certain or rigid 
doctrine. Rather, its edges are blurred and the full scope of its core principles is difficult 
to define."61 Hudson is not of the view, unlike many in the UK, and unlike the court in 
the leading case of Westdeutsche Landesbank, 62  that the ICT settled in to four 
categories and is thus "institutional".  
 
[17] The main advantage of the constructive trust is that it gives the plaintiff a proprietary 
remedy – a trump card in the insolvency process. A disadvantage is that it is difficult to 
identify the circumstances to justify the recognition of the ICT.63 From the restitutionary 
standpoint Grantham and Rickett identify that overall, while emanating the same 
function, "equitable remedies differ from common law ones in that they are 
discretionary."64 They argue that the remedy in equity, i.e. the transfer of property from 
the holder of the legal title to the person with the beneficial interest "does not follow as 
a right from the plaintiff's substantiation of the cause of action" because the recognition 
or existence of the trust, constructive or otherwise, "is dependent upon the favorable 
exercise by the court of its [equitable] discretion."65 They recognise that it is clear that 
the courts regard themselves as acting upon "fixed rules and settled principles", that is, 
the four types of constructive trust couched in the language "institutional", but that these 
settled principles are not evidenced. In Patel v Ali Goulding J, demystifying and 
providing some rare legal realism held that "in the end I am satisfied that it is within the 
court's … [equitable] discretion to accede to the defendants' prayer if satisfied that it is 
just to do so."66 
 
[18] What role in practice are the courts of equity, in recognising the ICT or imposing the 
RCT, performing? The question is not rhetorical; the courts are altering property rights. 
I use the analysis of Grantham and Rickett,restitutionary theorists, as a lens (call 
restitution a jurisprudential theory if you will)67 with which to uncover the failings in 
                                                
59 Some scholars have suggested that Denning LJ's personal "Christian naturalism" explains his approach 
in Hussey v Palmer: see Andrew Phang "The Natural Law Foundations of Lord Denning's thought and 
Work" (1999) 14 Denning LJ 159. However, this overlooks that the Court of Chancery has always had 
Christian Naturalism in its historical foundation – stemming from the Lord Chancellor as an ecclesiastical 
figure.  
60 Hudson, above n 26. 
61 At 552. 
62 Westdeutsche Landesbank, above n 6. 
63 See generally Ross Grantham "Doctrinal Bases for the Recognition of Proprietary Rights" (1996) 16 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 561. 
64 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 400. See also Lamare v Dixon (1873) LR 6 HL 414 at 423; and 
Patel v Ali [1984] 2 WLR 960 (Ch) at 965. See generally Walter Ashburner Principles of Equity 
(Butterworths, London, 1902) at 23; George Williams Keeton and LA Sheridan Equity (Rose, London, 
1969) at 484–485; Michael Tilbury Civil Remedies (Butterworths, Sydney, 1990) vol 1 at 287 and 
following; ICF Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies (5th ed, LBC, Sydney, 1997) at 4; and P 
Loughlan "No Right to the Remedy?: An Analysis of Judicial Discretion in the Imposition of Equitable 
Remedies" (1989) 17 MULR 132. 
65 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 400. 
66 Patel v Ali, above n 64, at 965 as cited in Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 400. 
67 John Lowry "Structure and Justification in Private Law: Essays for Peter Birks [Book Review]" (2009) 
20 King's Law Journal 185; Richard A Posner The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Mass), 1993); Peter Birks "Adjudication and interpretation in the common law: a century of 
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the constructive trust doctrine and to support the thesis that, if one accepts the failings 
in the ICT doctrine but continues to recognise it as a useful equitable remedy, then one  
should accept the RCT as a purer and legitimate equitable remedy. 
 
[19] Grantham and Rickett argue that all proprietary remedies in equity ultimately depend on 
the court's discretion,68 even if the courts themselves refuse to recognise or actively 
disavow this factor, as with the ICT which is said to "arise by operation of law".69 I use 
their recognition of the fundamental discretionary nature of all equitable proprietary 
remedies to argue that the RCT and the ICT have no distinction, because recognition of 
the former as legitimate leaves no choice but to also recognise the latter. Even Sir Peter 
Millett, an RCT detractor, and opposed to the trust as a form of remedy,  observed that 
in practice of the UK jurisdiction:70  
 
While we still insist on the institutional character of the constructive trust, however, we 
[the judiciary] undoubtedly use it as a remedial instrument…Thus the expression 
"constructive trust" may either be used in an institutional sense, when it is used in 
contradistinction to other kinds of trust, or in a remedial sense, when it is used in 
contradistinction to other proprietary remedies…    
 
[20] The "principle distinctions" between the institutional and the remedial constructive 
trusts are not in fact based on principle. The main academic criticisms against the RCT 
are easily overcome and Lord Denning's dicta in Hussey v Palmer, while lacking in 
substance, he identified the "core" of the trust in equity – a mechanism or remedy to 
effect "fairness and justice" – an equitable term of art which the judiciary and 
academics describe as "unconscionability". Thus, distilled to its core, the trust is a 
proprietary remedy in equity imposed to do justice inter parties.  
 
[21] The "unconscionability" only comes to the fore once the institutional character of the 
trust has been recognised or, as Lord Neuberger describes: "fairness and reasonableness 
… merely fills the gap, where there is one, as to how the beneficial interest under that 
institutional trust are to be assigned."71 While he admits that this is an "exaggerated" 
argument against the RCT,72 even he is willing to concede that apart from its problems 
"It's a pretty good concept".73 It is hard to reconcile his tacit recognition that even in an 
ICT situation "fairness and reasonableness", which are normative discretionary concepts, 
have some role in assigning the beneficial interest (which is the most important 
question) with his dicta in Sinclair Investments:74 
 
                                                                                                                                          
change" (1994) 14 Legal Studies 156; and Peter Linzer "Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and 
Reliance, Contracts and Torts" [2001]  Wis L Rev 695. 
68  Grantham and Rickett, above n 22: the authors are clearly promoting the positive jurisprudential 
viewpoint of the law of restitution 
69 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, above n 6, at 714–715. 
70 Sir Peter Millett "Restitution and Constructive Trusts" (1998) 114 LQR 399 at 402. 
71 Neuberger, above n 2, at [19]. 
72 At [42]. 
73 At [6]. 
74 Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Group plc [2011] EWCA Civ 347, [2012] Ch 453 at [37] 
per Neuberger LJ. Lord Neuberger later overruled his own judgment in FHR European Ventures LLP v 
Cedar Capital Partner LLC [2014] UKSC 45, although on a different issue. 
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Whether a proprietary interest exists or not is a matter of property law, and is not a 
matter of discretion…it follows that the courts of England … do not recognise a 
remedial constructive trust as opposed to an institutional constructive trust. 
 
If the assignment of the beneficial interest in the ICT, once the trust is recognised, can 
be based on "fairness and reasonableness", then it is illogical that the UK courts do not 
recognise a RCT when the assignment of the property right in equity is the key question. 
In RCT and ICT the courts do so to varying extents on a discretionary basis. The 
secondary argument that the RCT offends against the fundamental principle of certainty 
of law and property rights 75  falls by the wayside if his Lordship has pro tanto 
recognised that, in contentious ICT situations, discretion is a "gap filler". The ICT, at its 
fringes, is no more principled and certain than an RCT.  
 
[22] This is seen most clearly with the simple express trust. When a beneficiary asks for his 
Saunders v Vautier rights,76 that is, to call in his beneficial interest, the court uses its 
recognition of the (pre-existing) trust as a remedial mechanism to transfer the property 
to him. There is no discretion. The court essentially acts in the same way for the ICT 
and the RCT except that it construes the situation (hence the "constructive" in the trusts 
name), using discretion. The court recognises the trust using equitable discretion. And it 
is the construction itself where the exercise of discretion is apparent. Ultimately, 
whether the trust originated before the hearing (as in the case of an ICT) is not 
particularly relevant: what is relevant is whether or not the court recognises the trust and 
it does so, I argue, based on its equitable discretion. If the reader is uncomfortable with 
this truism one might be better to describe it as an equitable judicial discretion to 
discern fact. As with all judicial discretion, several factors influence this – the factual 
matrix and conduct of the parties – but in the end the plaintiff is applying to the court of 
equity: it is fairness and justice and a critical judicial eye which will ultimately construe 
the trust, or not. Both institutional and remedial constructive trusts as inherently 
remedial in that they are in practice equitable mechanisms for effecting a remedy for 
transferring property from party A to party B based on the judge's discretion of 
recognising the trust. With the ICT "the court declares as a matter of history the 
existence of equitable rights"77 and this is essentially a forensic measure, however, with 
this "institutional" exercise the court still retains residual discretion with regards to 
ICT's whether or not to declare the trust based on the facts it forensically examines.78 
The logical point is normally overlooked and this is key to the relationship between the 
RCT and the ICT. 
 
[23] To deny the RCT is to deny that the ICT is in fact used as a remedy to transfer property 
from A to B.79 In my latter analysis of the four factors of the RCT as posited by 
Grantham and Rickett, it is clear that factor number two – the improper enrichment of 
the defendant (the legal title holder) in its correct language and form as identified by 
Lord Denning in Hussey v Palmer – "fairness and justice" is the true core of the trust, 
                                                
75 Neuberger, above n 2, at [28]. 
76 Saunders v Vautier (1841) 4 Beav 115, 49 ER 282 (Ch). 
77 Trew, above n 4, at 175. 
78 At 175. 
79 On any practical viewing of the ICT, this is inevitably what happens to the property in question – the 
court ensures it moves, legally from the hands of party A to party B. 
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any trust, even the express trust. Although I fully recognise "fairness and justice" 
(unconscionability) alone are not enough to justify a proprietary response in equity, they 
are the important factor in the courts exercising its discretion to impose a discretionary 
remedial constructive trust over property. 
 
 
Bold Sprits – The conceptualisation of Fairness and Justice in the Constructive Trust 
[24] During the reign of Lord Denning MR arose the short lived period of his "new model" 
constructive trust.80  In Hussey v Palmer a mother lived together with her daughter at 
her daughter’s house.The mother paid for an extension to be built and after a 
disagreement the mother decamped. The mother claimed that she had a proprietary 
interest in the house by way of resulting trust. The Court of Appeal held instead that a 
constructive trust was created in her favor as it would be unconscionable for the money 
(or the proceeds – the extension) to be retained without a proprietary right arising. Lord 
Denning controversially stated:81     
 
Although the plaintiff alleged that there was a resulting trust, I should have thought that 
the trust in this case, if there was one, was more in the nature of a constructive trust: but 
this is more a matter of words than anything else. The two run together. By whatever 
name it is described, it is a trust imposed by law whenever justice and good conscience 
require it. It is a liberal process, founded upon large principles of equity, to be applied 
in cases where the legal owner cannot conscientiously keep the property for himself 
alone, but ought to allow another to have the property or the benefit of it or a share in it. 
The trust may arise at the outset when the property is acquired, or later on, as the 
circumstances may require. It is an equitable remedy by which the court can enable an 
aggrieved party to obtain restitution. 
 
 
[25] Scholars outline that "The underlying and indeed often expressed objectives of the 
judges in the cases in which what became known as 'new model' constructive trusts 
were imposed was to prevent results which would otherwise have been inequitable."82 
Professor Oakley noted in the 1978 edition of his Constructive Trusts book that what 
later became known as the "new model" "[might] be symptomatic of a general change 
of attitude towards the constructive trust." Presumably, one founded on "justice and 
good conscience,"83 however that might be defined. This did not come to fruition in the 
UK and in NZ. 
  
                                                
80 Hussey v Palmer, above n 34, at 43. 
81 At 1289–1291 (emphasis added). 
82 AJ Oakley Constructive Trusts (3rd ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) at 22. 
83 AJ Oakley Constructive Trusts (1st ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1978) at 24. 
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III The four (give or take) ICT categories?84  
 
[26] The term "institution" is mystifying. The settled categories of constructive trusts ignore 
the inherent "ambiguity in its use." The granting of a proprietary remedy is the most 
powerful remedy that equity can give.  The term "constructive" "offers little or no insight 
into its real nature, how it differs from other trusts [for example express], or what factors 
call the trust into existence."85 The ICT is a class of trust which is set in contrast to the 
true "express trust": that is,  "I hold this property on trust for you", as opposed to the court 
construing that the trustee holds property on trust. 
[27] That these situations are discernable is debatable. However the UK and NZ courts 
generally recognise an existing ICT when either of the following situations are  
identifiable:86 
 
i. A tracing claim: Equity directly vindicates pre- existing property rights. The 
legal titleholder has property and  tracing has identified it as belonging in equity 
to a beneficiary. The defendant cannot retain a property right against the 
plaintiffs'/beneficiaries' equitable ownership. The constructive trust is used as a 
mechanism "by which equity gives effect to and recognises the plaintiffs' 
ownership of the asset."87 
 
ii. A trustee de son tort: Lord Browne-Wilkinson outlined the liability of a third 
party  in breach of trust or fiduciary duty.88 However, Millett LJ outlined the 
inappropriateness of classifying a third party breach of trust as "liable to 
account as contrastive trustee" in Paragon Finance plc v D Thakerar & Co (a 
firm).89 In his opinion, such a person was not in fact a trustee as he was never in 
the position of a trustee.There was no trust and "usually no possibility of a 
proprietary remedy; [the trust is] 'nothing more than a formula for equitable 
relief'."90 But yet we consider such a person and such a class of trusts an ICT.91 
 
iii. Lack of formality: this is the "easy to spot" traditional and early constructive 
trust and the trust which the court construes to fix the ineffectual express trust.92 
There will be an intention to create an express trust but due to a lack of 
                                                
84 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 407. 
85 At 406. 
86 I will preempt criticism by noting that this essay was not written with the aim of outlining the types of 
ICT and the following categories are extremely broad. The categories overlook, at a glance: the 
relationship between trustee do son tort and personal liability to account (dishonest assistance and 
knowing receipt), Walsh v Lonsdale and Rochefoucault v Boustead type CTs amount many others. The 
many types of "Constructive Trusts" and whether the four broad categories are correct is outside the 
scope of this paper. 
87 At 406; See also Boscawen v Bajwa [1996] 1WLR 328 (CA) at 334–335; and Kuwait Oil Tanker Co 
SAK v Al Bader HC, 17 December 1998 at 63. 
88 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, above n 6, at 707. 
89 Paragon Finance plc v D Thakerar & Co (a firm) [1991] 1 ALL ER 400 (CA) at 408–409. 
90 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 407. 
91 Hudson, above n 27, at 552. 
92 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 408. Grantham and Rickett cite Lionel Smith "Constructive 
Trusts and Constructive Trustees" [1999] CL] 294 at 297–298, identifying that "[a]ll the early and 
traditional constructive trusts cases are of this type." 
  14 
formality or absence of trust property, "the parties' intention was legally non-
cognisable or ineffective."93 The court for reasons of equity, fairness and justice, 
construes the situation into a legitimate trust. 
 
iv. Breach of fiduciary duty: the Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid type trust. 
Where an employee receives a bribe he is bound to hold it on trust for his 
employer. This cannot be an express trust for obvious reasons "as the money 
would not have been received at the time of his fiduciary undertaking."94 
Through the constructive trust, equity gives effect to the fiduciary intentions of 
the parties.95 This case has not been without criticism. The main point is that 
"the court recognises the plaintiff's equitable ownership of the particular asset 
and it is effecting a trust which is held to have come into existence at some 
earlier time."96 
 
[28] Grantham and Rickett identify that the common theme of the above categories is that:97 
 
The [ICT] thus arises initially as a response to the intention of the parties. The court's 
declaration that the assets are held for the plaintiff is then a recognition of the plaintiff's 
pre-existing equitable property rights … The trust arises because of the parties' 
intentions, and thus it dates from a point in time well before the trial at which the court 
acknowledges the existence of that trust. At the time of trial, therefore, the property 
rights are already, as a matter of doctrine, in existence, and all the court is required to 
do is to give effect to those rights by ending the defendant's inference with them. 
 
In contrast to their definition, I identify another common theme. The ICT is an equitable 
mechanism for affecting a transfer of property from A to B which the court deems 
legitimately warranted by equity. They suggest that due to the intention of the parties 
and the plaintiffs' "pre-existing equable property rights", both key factors for discerning 
an ICT in the past, the court recognises the trust at the hearing (but arising at some past 
date). Conversely, I argue that these are factors for the court to construe and discern in a 
discretionary way.  
 
[29] The court hears evidence on the plaintiffs' pre-existing equitable property rights: 
equitable property rights differ from legal ones as equity takes into account factors 
contained in the maxims, for example conscience and unconscionablity (dare I suggest 
"fairness and justice"). The court hears evidence on the intentions of the parties and 
then gives effect to those intentions using mechanism of the constructive trust and by 
deeming the intentions of the parties in relation to the property to fit within one of the 
                                                
93 At 408. 
94 At 409. 
95 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid, above n 53; Although Sir Peter Millett in "Restitution and 
Constructive Trusts" (1998) 114 LQR 399 at 403-4., stated that “the paradigm example of the fiduciary is 
the express trustee, not the constructive trustee: and while all fiduciaries are subject to 
fiduciary obligations, they are not all subject to the same fiduciary obligations” thus indicating that there 
are different levels of fiduciary obligations and types of fiduciaries; see Chirnside v Fay [2006] NZSC 68., 
where the New Zealand Supreme Court (Elias CJ dissenting) allowed for allowances to be awarded to a 
defaulting fiduciary. 
96 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 409. 
97 At 410. 
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four institutional categories.98 An alternative view of the declaration is in fact that the 
ICT, the construing of the facts to create a trust, is the mechanism for the court to "do 
equity" and give legitimacy to its award of a proprietary remedy, when traditionally 
only an express trust would justify such an award. That some ICTs have existed in the 
law reports for many years does not beguile this point. 
 
IV The ICT is a fictional trust  
 
[30] "It is trite law," some may say, that ICT's arise on "the event" and not on the judicial 
assessment of the event. But the courts always must assess the event, read and hear 
submissions on the event and there may even be cross-examinations on the trust 
creating events. This would be to ignore the realities of evidential issues, coupled with 
the complication that the court is assessing beneficial title, which is always invisible. If 
it were axiomatic that the ICT arises on the "event" and the court merely recognised this, 
as this legal fiction suggests, then perhaps litigants should stop going to court and those 
who are sure of their beneficial title should just physically take it. What would the 
courts have said if the Attorney-General for Hong Kong had his agents occupy Mr 
Reids' houses because the titles belonged in equity to the people of Hong Kong as 
opposed to arguing all the way to the Privy Council?99 The same could be said of very 
recent UK SC case of FHR European Venture LLP v Cedar Capital Partners.100 Is the 
answer "but I have the yet to be recognised equitable title" a defense to the torts of 
trespass or conversion, especially if that trust is constructive? The trite response that 
ICTs arise on "happenings of events" fail to recognise that the pages of equity texts are 
littered with various "events" being argued to the highest courts in the lands.       
 
[31] I argue that a common theme of the four ICT categories, is not, while it can appear the 
condition precedent for the ICT occurring, conduct in the past and the court of equity 
merely recognising the trust at a later date, but actually that the ICT is an equitable 
mechanism for effecting a transfer of property from A to B which the court deems 
legitimately warranted by equity. Such a mechanism, the ICT, is thus a remedy. The RCT 
is also a remedy, effecting the same outcome and they are of little distinction. The only 
distinction being in name/language, with the courts recognising at the outset of the RCT 
that they are using a trust as a remedy, whereas with the ICT this is done in a much more 
subtle way. 
 
An Erstwhile Existence? 
[32] A RCT will exist regardless of what the court names the trust, or how the court 
describes its actions/order "where a trust over assets is imposed by a court as a remedial 
response to the plaintiff's otherwise personal claim."101 It is a use of equity's ability to 
award proprietary based remedies for a personal situation of unconscionability or 
"unfairness" – "injustice" relating to property. To quote Tipping J in Fortex v Macintosh, 
                                                
98 Swadling, above n 1. 
99 Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid, above n 53.  
100 FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC [2014] UKSC 45, 3 WLR 535. The 
UKSC overuled Sinclair Investments v Versailles Trade in favour of Attorney General for Hong Kong v 
Reid. 
101 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 412. 
  16 
a RCT is "one which is imposed by the Court as a remedy in circumstances where, 
before the order of the Court, no trust of any kind existed",102 those circumstances being 
personal inter parties. If one can think of a borderline ICT case, 103  then perhaps 
regardless of the court's classification of said trust as an ICT, it may in fact be an RCT. 
A tomato is still fruit, even though it does not appear in the fruit bowl. The RCT's 
existence depends on the courts order, with the court able to impose the RCT so long as 
at the time of the order there are "assets … in respect of which the Court considers it 
appropriate to impress a trust in favor of the plaintiffs."104 In the Australian High Court 
cases of Muschinski v Dodds105 and Baumgartner v Baumgartner106 it was held that the 
RCT could be imposed by the court "despite the common intention of the parties" and 
that "the [remedial] constructive trust serves as a remedy which equity imposes 
regardless of actual or presumed intention." 107  In Australia the "RCT is the most 
common from of constructive trust" as the Australian CT is characterised as 
remedial. 108  The overall Australian approach is in two stages emphasising the 
discretionary nature of the proprietary remedy. The approach essentially mirrors the 
four stage test suggested by Grantham and Rickett below.109   
 
The strong remedial distinction 
[33] Grantham and Rickett argue that where a RCT is sought as a response to a situation, "it 
is nothing other than a plea for the court [of equity] to exercise its strong remedial 
discretion" and that therefore on a doctrinal basis "there is no connection with trusts at 
all."110 Such a radical view need not be entirely accepted but is incidentally supported 
by the analysis of Professor Swaddling. However the authors go further by quoting and 
ostensibly agreeing with Professor Langbein's historical view that in a RCT situation, in 
effect "the chancellor says to a defendant who is not a trustee, '[b]ecause the outcome 
can be made convenient, I'm going to treat you as though you were a trustee, even 
though we all know you are not'." 111  I have no qualms in concluding that the 
constructive trust is merely a remedial mechanism hidden in opaqueness. 
 
[34] The authors conclude that implicit in the RCT is the variation of property rights which 
have already been established by settled legal rules. The court uses its discretion at the 
time of the trial: 112  
 
… to carve out of the general assets of a defendant some form of proprietary interest in 
favor of the plaintiff, and then order that those assets be delivered to the plaintiff. This, 
therefore, amounts to a non-statutory discretion to vary property rights. It should be 
                                                
102 Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and Liquidation) v MacIntosh, above n 12, at 173. 
103 I have always been suspicious of Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Reid, however, I suggest this ICT 
as but one example and adding any more cases to this note would give cause for another paper. 
104 At 175. 
105 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16. 
106 Baumgartner v Baumgartner (1987) 164 CLR 137. 
107 Bathurst City Council (1998) 195 CLR 566 at 584. 
108 PW Young, Clyde E Croft and Megan Smith On Equity (Thomson Reuters, NSW, 2009) at 442 
109 David M Wright "The Australian Constructive trust" (2010) STEP Journal <www.step.org>. 
110 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 412. 
111 John H Langbein "The Later History of Restitution" in WR Cornish, Richard Nolan, Janet O'Sullivan 
and Graham Virgo (eds) Restitution Past, Present and Future (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 1998) 57 at 58. 
112 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 413. 
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clear by now that calling this response a "remedial constructive trust", whist perhaps 
providing a degree of comfort, avoids transparency. In its most immediate sense, the 
event to which the trust is the response is merely the court's decision. 
 
[35] This, I argue, is one of the main underlying arguments against the RCT, and I have 
quoted the authors because they, amongst others, best identify it: that the "event to 
which the trust is the response is merely the court’s decision." That decision, which 
Grantham and Rickett do not go on to discuss, will normatively be based on some form 
of "fairness and justice" or the phraseology which is more in vogue – unconscionability 
– there is little practical distinction between these phrases. I nevertheless suggest that 
does not make the court's decision and thus "the event" (the unconscionability) to which 
the trust (as a remedy) is the response to, any less legitimate then the ICT, as Grantham 
and Rickett argue and that is where we depart.  
 
[36] Looking to the ICT, the four or so categories are not as settled and clear as one would 
think by their "institutional" namesake – the word "institutional" giving them legitimacy.  
When it is appropriate for the court to recognise or impose a proprietary remedy? There 
is a lack of practical distinction between the ICT and the RCT, confusion reigns as to 
the nature and the function of the former which has lead to a misstep in the doctrinal 
analysis of the availability of proprietary remedies in equity.113 Two questions follow: 
first, if a RCT is available, what cause of action or factors is it a response to? Secondly, 
is the response appropriate and legitimate enough to raise a proprietary remedy?  
 
V A Legitimate RCT? 
 
[37] Grantham and Rickett argued in 2000 that the analyses for the imposition of a RCT 
were largely unsatisfactory.114 Their argument is that commentators and judges either 
ignore the second question, appropriateness and legitimacy of a proprietary remedy, or 
"invoke opaque but historically proven terminology" which leads to the inevitable – a 
decent into naked arbitrary decision making.115 
 
[38] It is vital for the legitimacy of the doctrine of the RCT that one first addresses the 
appropriateness of the proprietary nature of the remedy and secondly that any answer to 
this question is informed by rational and transparent principles and not cries to history. 
 
[39] In remedying the imperfection the authors identify potential definitional factors further 
legitimising the imposition of a discretionary RCT:116 
 
1. There will be a wider factual matrix "beyond those matters which are 
directly relevant to the cause of action" which will be used by the plaintiff 
(beneficiary) to justify the imposition. This could be described as the justice or 
fairness or unconscionability of the factual matrix.  
                                                
113 At 415. 
114 At 414 they reference the critique by D Paciocco "The Remedial Constructive Trust: A Principled 
Basis for Priorities over Creditors" (1989) 68 Can Bar Rev 315. 
115 At 415. 
116 At 415. 
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2. Using the language of restitution, the defendant will be "improperly 
enriched at the expense of the plaintiff", or. I suggest to put the phrase in the 
negative, the defendant will not be able to satisfy the court on equitable 
maxims/principles that he should keep the property. His hands will not be 
clean. Think moral turpitude – unconscionability – injustice – unfairness in 
equitable terms.  
 
[40] Yet as Grantham and Rickett identify, these two factors alone justify no more than a 
remedy in personam, a personal monetary remedy that is normally useless in the 
insolvency process.117 To get a proprietary response, something more is required. A 
property remedy can not merely flow whenever the defendant is insolvent.118 Two other 
factors are justified: 
 
3.  Consideration of third parties:119  
Such is the nature of a proprietary remedy that it must inevitably impact on the rights of 
third parties, particularly the defendant's secured creditors. In imposing a [RCT] the 
court is bluntly varying the existing property rights of the defendant's creditors, thereby 
effectively expropriating their rights away from them in favor of the plaintiff. The state 
of the conscience of those third parties with an interest in the defendant's assets must, 
therefore, be a significant factor in the decision to impose a constructive trust and, in 
effect, disentitle them. 
 
[41] This is essentially what Lord Browne-Wilkinson identified as one of the benefits of the 
RCT. Since it is discretionary, a judge could refuse to order its imposition because it 
would unfairly impact on innocent third parties. Tipping J put this in the alternative by 
refusing to impose a RCT in Fortex because nothing negative affected the conscience of 
the third party creditors, namely they had done nothing which in the eyes of equity 
meant that they should be deprived of their property rights and therefore a RCT in favor 
of the plaintiff was inappropriate.120 
 
4.  Common intention or understanding or legitimate expectation: 
This limb stems from cases dealing with relationship property and breakdowns 
of de facto marriages. Such cases suggest that the "presence of some common 
intention, understanding or legitimate expectation that the plaintiff would have 
in the property is also crucially relevant."121 Although the word "legitimate" 
might be crossing doctrines a little, Cooke P's dicta in Gillies v Keogh 
emphasised that the "reasonable expectations in light of the conduct of the 
parties are at the heart of the matter."122 A moment for pause is required: these 
expectations will never amount to the type of expectations of the caliber enough 
to constitute an ICT. They will "fall short" or be "too nebulous to ground an 
                                                
117 At 415. 
118 At 416. 
119 At 416. 
120 Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and Liquidation) v MacIntosh, above n 12, at 176. 
121 At 416. 
122 Gillies v Keogh [1989] 2 NZLR 327 (CA) at 331 as cited in Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and 
Liquidation) v MacIntosh, above n 12. 
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institutional constructive trust".123 The expectation and the court's belief in its 
legitimacy is a factor which supports the imposition of a proprietary remedy – it 
is "a factor which equity may take into account in the exercise of its 
discretion".124 One must reasonably expect to be beneficially entitled to the 
property in order to justify a court awarding a proprietary remedy. The 
reasonableness of that expectation is for the court to decide. This does not 
conflict with the dicta in the Australian High Court125 where the court held that 
it could impose the trust "regardless of the common intentions of the parties". 
The conflict can be resolved because it will always be the legitimate intention 
of at least one of the parties that the property should be beneficially entitled to 
one of them. Expectations are always for the court to construe. 
 
Grantham and Rickett's four limbs pro tanto 
[42] A distinction arises, a plaintiff may be able to make a case where he is entitled to a 
remedy based on the first two factors. However the court must consider factors three 
and four when deciding to impose that remedy in a proprietary way: hence the 
discretion inherent in the imposition of the RCT. It is likely factor two, where much of 
the discussion and the discretion is inherent, the "unconscionability" of the situation, so 
to speak. Yet it is factors three and four which may give the courts some form of 
legitimacy if they so choose to award the trust over the property – the principle behind 
the expropriation of the property from A to B.126  
 
[43] This is not to say that overall a court could not choose to ignore or discount factors 
three or four. Similarly, as with regards to ICT it "..is thus merely a consequence, or 
recognition, of the property rights so created … [that] the rights have already arisen; 
and the trust is deemed in order to give them transparency"127 as the trust is considered 
existing before the legal interest is transferred to the creditor. The former two factors 
may be so strong that a court might feel justified in outweighing the latter. The court 
may also predate its order, to a time before the legal right passed to the creditor, as in 
practice the remedial mechanism of the ICT works.128 But again, this creates problems 
of legitimacy.  
 
[44] Some may still think that the only satisfactory RCT will be one where the property in 
question is not in the insolvency mix, although that is unlikely to eventuate, as a 
personal remedy will then be sufficient. A plaintiff pleads for a trust  because it exempts 
the property (in his eyes his property) from the regime. In Fortex the Court of Appeal 
appeared to conclude that the NZ insolvency regime did not prevent it from creating a 
new property right effectively during insolvency, although, perhaps due to factor three, 
                                                
123 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 417. 
124 At 417. 
125 Bathurst City Council (1998) 195 CLR 566 at 584. 
126 For an example of an RCT imposed along the lines of the Grantham and Rickett's suggestions please 
see the appendices. 
127 Grantham and Rickett, above n 22, at 414. 
128 With regards to the ICT, the court traditionally recognises the "trust" in favor of the beneficiary arising 
before the common law title has transferred to the third party creditor. And thus the equitable title (which 
trumps common law) has always remained with the beneficiary; the creditor never had good title. 
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the court chose not to do so.129 The mechanics of the operation of this trust leave much 
to be explored in future RCT cases. 
 
[45] Many definitions of the constructive trust "simply reflect the orthodoxy that the 
"constructive trust" is a genuine trust"130 and one is reminded of the "arise by operation 
of law" adage.131  This definition is not helpful. I turn to Professor Swadling who 
submits that the essential element of the express trust, the true trust, is missing from 
constructive trusts, which in its most basic form is the "idea of one person holding 
rights for another or for a purpose."132 It is missing axiomatically because the court has 
to construe that purpose, hence the nomenclature "constructive" trust. Swadling 
explains that this underlies Pound's comment133 that "An express trust is a substantive 
institution. Constructive trust, on the other hand, is purely remedial institution … [There 
is not] the substance of a trust."134 I focus on this part of Swadling's thesis; the use of 
fictitious language in trusts law and his chariot cry "Why not call a spade a spade".135  
 
 
VI The Preponderance of Language: legitimate remedial 
mechanism due to the illegitimate linguistic distinction  
 
[46] The orthodox position in UK Law is that the constructive trust is as much a trust as an 
express trust with the only difference being that it is "construed by the court". Swadling 
argues that this is false, representative of the constructive trust as a legal fiction and not  
like the express trust. The only true trust in English law is the express trust.136 One can 
identify that the constructive trust is a mask of "language" – a portmanteau – for two 
types of court orders; (i) that the defendant pay a sum of money to the claimant; and (ii) 
that the defendant convey a convey a particular right to the claimant. These orders are 
similar to my "CT as a mechanism". Only then, Swadling argues, once the "fictitious 
nature of the 'trust' is realised can any coherent analysis of the incidence of such orders 
be made." 137  A secondary incidence of his argument is, as Grantham and Rickett 
identify, that the ICT is inherently remedial and thus there is no distinction between the 
ICT and RCT. However, logic dictates that if a jurisdiction, such as the UK, still accepts 
the legitimacy of the ICT, in spite of Swadling's "hard to swallow" argument,138 then 
there is no logical reason to reject the RCT as an any less functional remedial 
mechanism.  
 
The constructive trust as two "dressed" court orders  
                                                
129 Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and Liquidation) v MacIntosh, above n 12, at 178. 
130 Swadling, above n 1, at 9. 
131 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, above n 6, at 714–715. 
132 Swadling, above n 1, at 9. 
133 Roscoe Pound "The Progress of law – Equity" (1920) 33 Harv L Rev 420 at 421. 
134 Pound, above n 133, at 421 as cited in Swadling, above n 1, at 13. 
135 Swadling, above n 1, at 14. 
136 At 2. 
137 At 1. 
138 At 35. 
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[47] The "court order" analysis is a broader substantiation that the constructive trust is a 
judiciously exercised mechanism to legitimise the transfer of property by way of trust 
from A to B. Therefore, if this is in fact what a ICT is doing and is being used by the 
courts to do, then the RCT is in effect the same mechanism, the transfer of property 
from A to B, based on equitable principles but with the key distinction that no linguistic 
"dressing" is required. Such chicanery beguiles wanting simplicity in the law of 
constructive trusts. 
 
[48] The RCT is a discretionary proprietary remedy based on fairness and justice and 
unconscionability: this has led to its rejection as unprincipled.139 The ICT hides behind 
its veil of an "institution" when yet it too is a proprietary remedy applied in a 
discretionary way and has no distinction from the RCT.140 Distinction and legitimacy is 
created by calling the ICT "institutional" and pointing to events creating equitable title: 
yet it is truly discretionary for the court to recognise it. The only distinction pro tanto 
between an ICT and an RCT is that the RCT admits its remedial and discretionary 
nature and therefore is labeled unprincipled, whereas the ICT pretends to be principled 
and hides behind the language of "institution" or, as Swadling describes, the "fiction" of 
the constructive trust. If courts are prepared to accept the ICT, they should recognise 
that they are accepting a remedial beast and accept the RCT, for the two are the same. 
The so called "four categories" of ICTs are underpinned by fairness and justice and 
unconscionability as Lord Denning identified.  
 
Through the fiction the fog clears 
[49] In Dubai Aluminum Co Ltd v Salaam Millett LJ described the language of constructive 
trusts as "a trap",141 and it is a trap which has lead the courts to view the ICT not as a 
trust but in truth a proprietary order in equity to pay money or to convey particular 
rights.142  Thus Swadling concludes it is this fiction which has lead to the illogical 
rejection of the RCT, for the RCT has been recognised as a discretionary equitable 
proprietary remedy, with courts rejecting its legitimacy because it is not a true trust (an 
ICT or express) as the foundation of the RCT is remedial. Equity has for a long time 
been awarding proprietary remedies based on the underlying principle of "fairness and 
justice" – if one regards that as discretion then so be it. The divide between RCT and 
ICT is untenable as "The truth is that all constructive 'trusts' are remedial, for they are 
nothing more than court orders; there can therefore be no such thing as an 'institutional' 
constructive trust."143  
 
VII Conclusion 
 
[50] That the drawing of this false distinction has not led to any wrongly decided case is of 
little comfort in so far as it has lead to "interminable confusion in the literature."144 I am 
                                                
139 Gareth H Jones and William Rodolph Cornish Restitution (Hart Publishing, London, 1998) at 220. See 
also Sir Peter Millet "Equity - The Road Ahead" (1995-6) 1, Vol 6, King’s College Law Journal, at 1. 
140 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16, at 451. 
141 Dubai Aluminum Co Ltd v Salaam [2003] 2 AC 366 at [142]. 
142 Swadling, above n 1, at 26. 
143 At 34. 
144 Swadling, above n 1, at 34. 
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grateful that is recognised. Swadling finds little merit in the RCT versus ICT debate. 
While I do not necessarily agree, I can certainly understand the vast literature and 
commentary which would have lead him to this glorious summation; 
 
"It is, however, a debate as cogent as a discussion of the merits of English 
versus American unicorns."145 
 
[51] Cogency aside Swadling is not alone to opine the fallacy of language used in trusts law. 
Professor Virgo's analysis is that the UK ICT has remedial aspects since there are 
elements of judicial discretion at play, but that the UK ICT will never be a "full blown" 
RCT- primarily because judges, when recognising the ICT, "do not purport to exercise 
any discretion when determining whether a constructive trust should be recognised."146 
Perhaps, on my analysis, if a judge were to purport, like Lord Denning in Hussey v 
Palmer,147 to be exercising discretion when recognising unconscionability, as opposed 
to using the stock phrase "unconscionable conduct" as an equitable term of art, then the 
UK ICT will begin to take on much more of a remedial flavor.  
 
[52] Leading constructive trusts scholars have described the UK ICT as more or less 
"apparently certain" and I think it logical to read fictionality into that apparent certainty 
as discussed above.148  Virgo asks the English Chancery bar "Do we really want to 
leave the apparent certainty of the institutional constructive trust and go down the more 
flexible road?"149 That road, as I have argued, is one of recognition of the inherent 
remedialism of the ICT, the mechanics of the remedy, and the RCT as a legitimate trust 
due to ICT and RCT having no distinction as a matter of principle. Departing from the 
certain road might be asking too much from the conservatives, even though I argue 
there is little underlying distinction bar settled categories between ICT and RCT. The 
UK et al should at least recognise that another road does legitimately exist, as has the 
rest of the Commonwealth.150 The latter road may at times be better and paving it 
would not destroy the foundation of property rights. Such a road would recognise that 
this proprietary remedy has elements of judicial discretion based on equitable principles. 
The answer is implicit in that Virgo's question is rhetorical: there are those who will 
always return to the stock response of Sir Peter Millett: 151 
 
[such RCT's are] … a counsel of despair which too readily concedes the impossibility 
of propounding a general rationale for the availability of proprietary remedies. 
 
                                                
145 At 34. 
146 Graham Virgo "Review: The Remedial Constructive Trust By David Wright" (1999) 58 CLJ 645, at 
646. 
147 Hussey v Palmer, above n 34. 
148 David Wright The Remedial Constructive Trust (Butterworths, Sydney, 1998) at ch 9.16. 
149 Virgo, above n 146, at 646. 
150 New Zealand in Fortex Group Ltd (In Receivership and Liquidation) v MacIntosh [1998] 3 NZLR 171 
(CA),; see also Regal Castings Limited v Lightbody [2008] NZSC 87., Australia in Muschinski v Dodds 
[1985] 62 ALR 429 (HCA)., Canada in Soulos v Korkontzilas [1997] 2 SCR 217., Singapore in Wee 
Chiaw Sek Anna v Ng Li-Ann Genevieve [2013] 3 SLR 801 (Court of Appeal).  
151 Jones and Cornish, above n 139, at 220. See also Millet, above n 139. 
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[53] Such opines are not constructive and only serve to polarise debate.152 Grantham and 
Rickett, theorists which undoubtedly uses the constructive trust as a remedy, clearly 
evidence their inherent remedial view of both the ICT and the RCT, and provide four 
limbs for awarding the later discretionary RCT. Yet Professor Birks said of the RCT 
that it was  "ugly, repugnant alike to legal certainty, the sanctity of property and the rule 
of law."153 I have noticed that those who criticise the RCT for it definitional normative 
language, hypocritically use language of worse ilk far more freely to criticise it. We 
must move on from this use of linguistic legal fictions in the language of constructive 
trusts. Both institutional and remedial CTs are inherently remedial, of the same "ilk" 
and rest on the inherent equitable foundation of judicial discretion and are a practical 
mechanism to transfer property in the court of equity. In this discourse progressive souls, 
even bold souls are not needed, only rational ones. Perhaps these bold souls might cry 
"yes it is true the courts of equity do alter property rights based on fairness and justice 
and they do so with discretion" – but he might shout it in the library ever so softly for 
such a view might still be accused of belonging to a heretic. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
152 At 415. 
153 P Birks Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths [1997] NZ L Rev 623 at 641. 
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VIII Appendices and Empirical Observations  
 
A) A Valid Remedy applied with Circumspect 
In the following passage I set out a contrived set of facts adopted from Leggett v Kensington154 
and argue for a legitimate imposition of an RCT along the lines of the judgment of Gault J in 
that case. 
 
[54] The remedy is a property right and in Australia, "Ordinarily relief by way of [remedial] 
constructive trust is imposed only if some other remedy is not suitable"155 so to in 
Canada where "in the vast majority of cases a [remedial] constructive trust will not be 
the appropriate remedy."156 The RCT in both countries where the remedy has taken 
hold is one awarded discerningly. In those jurisdictions the courtrooms are not Tribal-
Councils and do not dish out "palm tree justice" 157  as is the ostensible fear. The 
arguments against the RCT are not founded as practically they have not materialised 
due to the very factor which makes the RCT an admirable tool in equities armory:158 the 
trust rests on discretion, which judges are well schooled and more then capable of 
imposing, and our appeal systems are more then apt to temper. Judges use discretion 
when sentencing and remove the right of liberty, a higher order right than property: why 
some hold rights in rem to a higher standard I am uncertain.159  
 
[55] The counter argument for RCT being imposed only in circumspect is that such language 
should trigger a "warning light" for it indicates that a judge "may be … about to 
cheat"160 because she finds the legal reasoning behind recognising an ICT too difficult 
on the facts or because the ICT does not exist and she wishes to do justice and cannot 
with the institutional tools at hand. Should the law, especially equity, not provide 
remedies on the top shelf available in special circumstances where settled institutional 
principles do not seem to fit, or should the law have to be so bent and twisted that the 
logic of the ICT meaningless?  
 
An example of a valid RCT imposition? 
[56] The Plaintiff, who is ill informed in the ways of investing and is taken in by a company 
offering to sell to him and store gold bullion, the respondent is a Receiver appointed by 
a Bank who holds a "General Security Agreement"/"Present and After Acquired 
Property Clause" over all the property and assets of the bullion store. The plaintiff was 
deliberately mislead by the bullion store by way of certificates of insurance and title 
that the store held enough bullion to cover his account and that said bullion belonged to 
him and was separate from all other clients. His "Bullion Certificate" used the phrase 
"the bullion is yours and is non-allocated".  
 
                                                
154 Leggett v Kensington  (1993) 1 NZLR 257 (CA). 
155 Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22, (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [200].   
156 LAC Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd [1989] 61 DLR 14 at 51.   
157 Bryson v Bryant (1992) 29 NSWLR 188 at 196 per Kirby P, not to be confused with his brother 
Michael Kirby of the High Court of Australia Bench.  
158 Neuberger, above n 2, at [6]. 
159 If the highwayman gave me a choice between "your money or your life" the latter I would choose. 
160 At [31]. 
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[57] It was held : "That the understanding of non-allocated purchasers was deliberately 
fostered can hardly be open to doubt" and an internal company memo was furnished 
which stated that:  
 
The growth of the bullion market must lie in the education of the mass public and the 
consequent switching from traditional forms of investment to bullion….so the last fear 
they want in their minds is that their precious non-allocated metal does not actually 
exist.  
 
The memo continued "[o]f course, it is a different story for the businessman or the 
frequent purchaser, they understand how it works and accept it".  
 
[58] The Bank subsequently exercised its power of receivership over the bullion store when 
its loan fell due and claimed under its GSA all assets of the business. The plaintiff went 
to the premises to collect his gold to find that not only was there not enough bullion to 
cover his account but that it existed in one pile mixed with others and that the bank 
claimed that it had priority as secured creditor.  
 
[59] Council for the plaintiff would have a formidable task proving an ICT:161  for the 
claimants are at arm's length with the company as purchasers and thus no fiduciary 
relationship exists militating against an ICT, 162  and there existed no contractual 
requirement for the bullion to be set aside. There was no "separate property" for the 
trust to bite at due to the intermingling to bullion in one big pile. 
 
[60] This may be one of the situations where a RCT should be imposed due to the 
overarching consideration that "it would be unconscionable for the party into whose 
hands the property came to retain it against the claimant."163 A RCT may be imposed in 
absence of a fiduciary duty. But what of the Bank in whose hands the gold now sits? 
Justice Gault in Liggett v Kensington held that where "the company's conduct … [is] 
seen overall as inequitable and unconscionable justifying relief [the RCT is] subject to 
consideration of the competing claim of the secured creditor."164 
 
Turning to the competing claim of the bank, it would be difficult to impose an RCT 
where the third party had obtained fair value without notice, as the proprietary remedy 
in favor of the plaintiff would act in prejudice to the secured creditor.165 This is one of 
the main arguments against the RCT in general. However instead of stopping, as most 
do, at this step, why not simply seek evidence on what "notice" the secured creditor 
had? Or if the creditor had none, why not do what the law does best in such situations, 
                                                
161 Liggett v Kensington (in re Goldcorp Exchange) (1993) 1 NZLR 257 (CA) at 279 per Gault J. 
162 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington LBC, above n 6, at 997. Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
revising Chase Manhattan [1981] Ch 105, held that "further, I cannot understand how the recipient's 
'conscience' can be affected at a time when he is not aware of any mistake" as an example of the orthodox 
contention that in ICT situations some form of fiduciary relationship is usually required or construed. See 
also Re Diplock [1951] AC 251, which held that equitable tracing requires some form of fiduciary 
relationship. 
163 Liggett v Kensington, above n 161, at 281 per Gault J. 
164 At 282 per Gault J. 
165 At 283 per Gault J. 
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attempt to impute notice when it would be reasonable to do so? The whole foundation 
of the constructive trust, is the court construing facts: hence the distinction between the 
express trust where facts and deeds of trust are expressly stated. In Liggett v Kensington 
the bank had knowledge of Goldcorp's business model, while it did not express any 
concern as to the business model Gault J construed that it should have, knowing that 
Goldcorp was intent on attracting novice investors.166 He thus would have imposed a 
RCT over the gold belonging in equity to Mr Leggett, he would not have imposed a 
RCT over the gold belonging to the professional investors as Goldcorps conduct in 
relation to that class was not unconscionable because they knew the meaning of 
"unallocated" and the risks it entailed.167  
 
[61] In Re Goldcorp, The Privy Council rejected the Court of Appeal's recognition of an 
ICT168 and Lord Mustill rejected Gault J's RCT argument because he found the conduct 
of Goldcorp merely "wrongful in the sense of being a breach of contract, [and] it did not 
involve any injurious dealing with the subject-matter of the alleged trust."169 The case 
was one of breach of contract giving rise to a personal remedy. 
 
[62] Yet I ask anew, for the novice investors: if an ICT would not work in a Goldcorp 
situation, and neither would the Common Law rout, why not use the powerful remedy 
of the RCT?170  
 
 
  
                                                
166 Liggett v Kensington, above n 161, at 283 per Gault J. 
167 At 283 per Gault J. 
168 Re Goldcorp Exchange Ltd (in receivership) (Kensington v Liggett) [1994] 3 NZLR 385 (PC). 
169 At [18] per Lord Mustill. 
170 Roderick Peter Thomas Rethinking the Constructive Trust (University of Auckland, Auckland, 1995) 
at 66. 
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B) Lord Denning and natural justice in Equity  
There is a clear link between jurisprudential naturalism and the jurisprudence of Lord Denning, 
especially with regards to his equity judgments. 
 
[63] Denning LJ's dicta is steeped in natural law jurisprudence,171 not surprising considering 
his reliance on "fairness and justice". He provided "scope for a breath or two of fresh 
air" in to an area of company law "of a risk adverse disposition".172 He is remembered 
for his steadfast belief in that immutable fact that "Law is only the application, however 
imperfectly, of truth and justice in our everyday affairs."173 Many disagree with him on 
this point, but it is a hard pill to swallow to say that "truth and justice" should have no 
bearing on actions in equity, when the later maxims hold the concept at their core. 
 
C) Swadling's Categories of Constructive Trust 
I further explore the legitimacy behind Professor Swadling's two delineated categories of 
constructive trust.  
 
A constructive trust as a court order: (i) order to pay money 
[64] Take as an example a defendant who dishonestly assists a trustee to commit a breach of 
trust and the beneficiary who seek an award to make good their loss. For equity to reach 
through to non-trustee defendants a "magic formula was incanted: the defendants were 
said to be 'liable to account as if they were trustees'."174 The court does not say that the 
defendant is a trustee, there is no fiction, but he is liable to account as "if he were a 
trustee". Swadling highlights this clear line of thinking in the judgment of Ungoed-
Thomas J in Selangor United Rubber Estates v Cradock (No 3): "[The language of 
constructive trusts] is nothing more than a formula for equitable relief. The court of 
equity says that the defendant shall be liable in equity, as though he were a trustee."175 
However we now hear of third parties being described as "a constructive trustee" 
appearing that there is a trust but one "constructed" by the court, as opposed to the 
constructive trust being used as a formula for equitable relief.176 Or, as I argue, the ICT 
being used by the court as a mechanism, a remedy for relief. 
 
[65] This was the case in Re Montagu's Settlement Trust where Megarry V-C described the 
defendant as liable to account as a "constructive trustee"177 giving the impression that the 
defendant was indeed a trustee of a constructive trust, a trust construed by the court. Not 
as in fact, as he should have said, the defendant was liable to account "as if" the defendant 
were a trustee. 178  With the constructive trust being as Ungoed-Thomas J said, and 
Swadling argues merely a formula for equitable relief.  
 
                                                
171 Phang, above n 59. 
172 Len Sealy “Commercial Law and Company law” (1999) 14 Denning LJ 13, at 24.  
173 Lord Denning "Why I Believe in God" (talk given on the BBC, 14 December 1943). 
174 Swadling, above n 1, at 14. 
175 Selangor United Rubber Estates v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555 (Ch) at 1582 as cited in 
Swadling, above n 1, at 14. 
176 At 15. 
177 Re Montagu's Settlement Trust [1987] Ch 246. 
178 Swadling, above n 1, at 15. 
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[66] Therefore, if what is known as the classic ICT can be viewed, quite logically, as merely a 
formula for equitable relief over property belonging in equity to another, then those who 
accept that the ICT is inherently remedial179 are on the correct side of the divide. The 
point being that ICT is inherently remedial, and therefore there is no logical distinction 
between an ICT and a RCT. The latter should bask in the lime light of the recognition of 
its remedialism. 
 
In support of the second argument: (ii) orders to convey particular rights 
[67] Swadling asks, "What accounts for the use of language of constructive trusts in cases of 
orders to convey particular rights?"180 Those rights normally being constructive trusts 
over land, the answer he puts forward is the Court of Chanceries power to invoke the 
Saunders v Vautier Jurisdiction: 181 
…Brynyate said that the constructive trust was…"a remedial device by which a person 
can recover property to the present or future benefit of which he is equitable entitled. It is 
only by a fiction called a trust. The Court does not suppose that the constructive trustee 
has actually been holding or managing property for the cestui que use, but by a fiction it 
deems that he has been so doing, in order that the cestui que use may recover the property 
from him."  
Thus the reason for the fiction becomes more apparent. Millett LJ in Paragon Finance v 
Thakarer recognised the fiction in the language when he held that in pay money 
constructive trustee cases such trusts "were not in reality trusts at all, but merely a 
remedial mechanism by which equity gave relief".182  
 
The historical origins in support of Swadlings Contention  
[68] Indeed by 1985 the tide of judicial opinion changed with the High Court of Australia 
ruling in Muschinski v Dodds.183 Deane J supported by Mason J was of the opinion that 
"there is really no distinction between 'institutional’ and 'remedial' constructive trusts" 
for the purposes of Australian trusts law as both have strong remedial elements.184 
Justice Deane was clear that "The use or trust of equity, like equity itself, was 
essentially remedial in its origins" 185  and that overall the concept of the trust 
commenced life in medieval England as a remedy, introduced by equity to ameliorate 
the harshness of the common-law and it still bears traces of that raison d’être.186 Justice 
Deane’s thesis was that the constructive trust in Australia, whether remedial or 
institutional, had no remaining distinction if one ever did exist:187 it was a remedy 
"which may be molded and adjusted to give effect to the application and interplay of 
equitable principles in the circumstances of the particular case."188 As for the basis for 
imposing the remedy in Australia, Deane J held that "fairness" was simply a concept of 
                                                
179 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16, at 451 per Deane J. 
180 Swadling, above n 1, at 15. 
181 JW Brynyate Limitations of Actions in Equity (1932) at 57 as cited in Swadling, above n 1, at 15. 
182 Millet LJ in Paragon Finance v Thakarer, above n 89, at 409 as cited in Swadling, above n 1, at 17. 
183 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16. 
184 At 451 per Deane J. 
185 At [6] per Deane J. 
186 Waters, above n 31. 
187 Muschinski v Dodds, above n 16, at [8] per Deane J. 
188 At [8] per Deane J. 
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the "formless void of individual moral opinion"189 and that a court could not mandate a 
constructive trust (either imposed or recognised) based on such subjectivity (fairness) 
but that fairness as a notion was not wholly subjective as it had a sister concept which 
courts of Chancery have been dealing with for centuries:190  
 
That is not to say that general notions of fairness and justice have become irrelevant to 
the content and application of equity. They remain relevant to the traditional equitable 
notion of unconscionable conduct191 which persists as an operative component of some 
fundamental rules or principles of modern equity. 
 
Even though the High Court of Australia has seen through the fog, and recognised the illogic in 
the distinction, it has used a term of art to reject Hussey v Palmer "fairness and justice" and term 
instead the discretion on "unconscionability". Confusion still reigns in a forward thinking 
equitable jurisdictions. 
  
                                                
189 At [9] per Deane J but see Carly v Farrelly (1975) 1 NZLR 356 (HC) at 367; and Avondale Printers & 
Stationers Ltd v Haggie (1979) 2 NZLR 124 (HC) at 154. 
190 At [9] per Deane J. 
191 I have previously outlined that I consider "fairness and justice" and "unconscionability" to be two sides 
of the same coin: see [11]. 
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